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THE SEVENTH ANNUAL 
MEDIA AND SOCIETY LECTURE 
 
Protecting the American Playwright 
John Weidman† 
I want to begin by clarifying something which is going to 
become stunningly clear whether I clarify it now or not.  I am 
not an attorney.  I did in fact graduate from law school.  I did in 
fact take and pass the New York Bar Exam.  But to give you a 
sense of how long ago that was, when I finished the exam I 
celebrated by picking up a six pack of Heineken and going 
home to watch the Watergate Hearings.  
I have never practiced law.  But as President of the 
Dramatists Guild of America for the last eight years I have 
found myself in the middle of a number of legal collisions, the 
most important of which I’m going to talk about today, not from 
a lawyer’s perspective—although I may attempt to dazzle you 
with a couple of actual citations—but from the perspective of 
the playwrights, composers, and lyricists whose interests the 
Guild represents.   
First, some background:  The Dramatists Guild is the 
only national organization representing the interests of 
playwrights, composers, and lyricists writing for the living 
stage.   
Founded almost a hundred years ago, the Guild 
currently has over 6,000 members nationwide ranging from a 
kid in a dorm room somewhere struggling to finish his first one 
act play, to established playwrights working on Broadway, Off-
Broadway, and in regional theaters all over the country.  
Members over the years have included George S. Kaufman, 
  
 † President of the Dramatists Guild of America.  This speech was delivered 
at the Seventh Annual Media and Society Lecture, held on October 25, 2006, at 
Brooklyn Law School. 
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Eugene O’Neill, Arthur Miller, Lillian Hellman, and Tennessee 
Williams.  The Guild is governed by a Board of Directors, 
elected from its membership, which currently includes such 
writers as Edward Albee, Stephen Sondheim, John Guare, 
Marsha Norman, and John Patrick Shanley.  Past presidents 
include Richard Rodgers, Moss Hart, Oscar Hammerstein, Alan 
Jay Lerner, Robert Sherwood, and Peter Stone. 
Since its inception, the mission of the Guild has been to 
assist playwrights in protecting the artistic and economic 
integrity of the work which they create.  These efforts have 
taken a variety of forms, most significantly the development of 
a series of standard contracts the terms of which have 
guaranteed to playwrights the ability to control the content of 
the plays which they write, to control the disposition of those 
plays, and to earn a living from those plays if and when they 
are produced.   
Despite a predictable amount of noisy opposition from 
various elements within the theater community, these efforts 
have been largely successful.  The American theater, organized 
around the unique, idiosyncratic voice of the American 
playwright, has thrived, first and foremost, because of the 
brilliance of quintessentially American dramatists like Eugene 
O’Neill, Tennessee Williams, Stephen Sondheim and the 
equally brilliant interpretive artists with whom they’ve 
collaborated, but also because of the stable framework—both 
creative and economic—within which those dramatists and 
their partners have been able to do their work. 
Where did that stability come from?  For as long as 
anyone can remember, the community of artists and 
businessmen who make theater have shared a common set of 
assumptions about how a play or a musical makes its way from 
the page to the stage.   
Not infrequently, a new production has rung minor 
changes on these assumptions, but the basic assumptions have 
endured.  Everyone has known who did what.  Everyone has 
known who owned what.  Everyone has known who was in 
charge and who had the last word.  These assumptions were 
givens; they were taken for granted. 
They are not taken for granted anymore. 
Beginning perhaps ten to fifteen years ago, in what is 
still a developing but potentially seismic shift in the way 
theater is made, these assumptions began to be challenged, 
deliberately and aggressively, with consequences as yet 
uncertain for the future of the American playwright and, by 
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extension, for the future of the American Theater and the 
American theater-going public.  
The challenges have come, primarily, from two sources:    
First, from a group of producers, new to the business, and 
largely new to New York, and second, from directors, acting in 
concert through their union, the Society of Stage Directors and 
Choreographers, or SSD&C.   
At their core, both challenges are about the same thing: 
copyright.  The playwright’s copyright.  The playwright’s 
undisputed ownership of his play, legally and artistically, 
which, heretofore, has been the bedrock constant around which 
all theater-making has been organized.   
Until now.   
First, I want to talk about the challenges being mounted 
by producers.  But before I do, a brief digression into the 
difference between writing for the theater and writing for the 
movies.  
Playwrights write plays.  Screenwriters write 
screenplays.  On the most fundamental level, they both engage 
in the same creative exercise.  The writer sits down in front of a 
blank piece of paper and stares at it with a mounting sense of 
dread until, as George S. Kaufman said, blood begins to seep 
from his forehead.  Writing can be painful, whether you’re 
writing a play or a screenplay.  But the intermittent sense of 
suicidal desperation which playwrights and screenwriters 
sometimes share is about the only thing they share. 
A screenwriter is an employee.  The work he does is 
work for hire.  From the beginning, he understands that 
everything he writes will immediately become the property of 
the studio which employs him.   
As legal author of the film, that studio can change the 
content of the screenwriter’s script at will.  His pirate captain 
can become a teenage runaway, his teenage runaway a Cocker 
Spaniel, his original story, set in Boston during the War of 
1812, can be moved to the fifth moon of Jupiter.   
Sooner or later, things like this will happen, because 
things like this always happen, and when they do, the 
screenwriter will feel talentless, humiliated, and, most 
importantly, every single author’s impulse that made him want 
to be a writer in the first place will be ground into the dust.  
What about the playwright?  The playwright is an 
independent contractor.  He owns his work and is free to 
dispose of it as he sees fit.  If a producer wants to mount a 
production of his play, the playwright will grant the producer a 
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defined package of performance rights for a limited time while 
reserving all other rights to himself.  The producer will not be 
able to hire a director, or actors, or designers to work on his 
play without his approval.  And no one will be able to change a 
word of what he’s written without his permission. 
So why would anyone choose to write for the movies 
when they could write for the theater?  The answer is—as it so 
often is—money.   
Screenwriters are actually paid to write.  The typical 
studio deal involves a hefty advance paid to the writer before 
he goes to work, and  as he continues working, he can count on 
receiving a predictable series of additional payments.   
The playwright, on the other hand, works for nothing.  
Some plays are written on commission, but the vast majority 
are simply written—by someone, somewhere with an impulse 
and an idea.   
The playwright will be compensated, if at all, not with 
studio-style advances and step deal payments, but with a small 
prospective sliver of every dollar which may or may not one day 
come in at the box office.  Which means he will not see any 
return on his labors unless and until a producer decides to 
produce his play and an audience decides to buy tickets to see 
it. 
So why does he do it? 
He does it because it is in the theater, and only in the 
theater, that the dramatic writer can retain ownership and 
control of the work which he creates.  He does it because it is in 
the theater, and only in the theater, that he knows his own 
unique, idiosyncratic voice will be heard, unedited and 
uncompromised.    
Which brings us back to copyright.  That the playwright 
owns his copyright is both a reflection of the fact that the 
theater is a writer’s medium, and a legal firewall guaranteeing 
that it will remain that way.  
Assaults on that copyright would have been unheard of 
thirty years ago.  But as Jerry Brown said, that was then and 
this is now.  And now, as I have said, assaults on the 
playwright’s copyright are being mounted by both producers 
and directors.    
First the producers.   
Twenty-five years ago, something happened on 
Broadway.  The musical Cats opened, and in certain 
fundamental ways, the commercial theater was changed 
forever.  Prior to Cats, a hit show was a show which ran for 
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two, perhaps three years.  A smash hit, like My Fair Lady, 
might run for five or six.  Cats ran for eighteen years.  And 
even more significantly, the London production, which had 
been replicated on Broadway, was then replicated in dozens of 
other Broadway-like productions around the world.  
In the old days, meaning let’s say the 1960s, the 
producers of a hit Broadway show might send out a national 
touring company, after which they might mount the show in 
London’s West End.   
From the point of view of the producers, the investors, 
and the authors, the income from these productions would 
certainly have been substantial, but not so substantial as to 
call attention to itself outside the relatively insulated economic 
world of the theater. 
Cats, along with sister shows like Les Miserables and 
Phantom of the Opera, changed all that.  The money to be made 
from two dozen identical versions of a hit show, playing to sold 
out houses in two dozen cities around the world, was clearly 
enormous.  Indeed, in January of this year, Variety reported 
that Phantom of the Opera had become the most successful 
entertainment venture of all time—more successful than Star 
Wars, more successful than Harry Potter—grossing 1.9 billion 
dollars in the United States, 3.2 billion dollars world wide, 
from ticket sales alone.1   
Clearly, these were sums of money not to be left in the 
hands or the pockets of what had heretofore been thought of as 
a mere Broadway producer.   
About whom a brief aside:  Max Bialystock, Mel 
Brooks’s super-shyster impresario, when accused of defrauding 
the investors in his new musical, Springtime for Hitler, defends 
himself to the judge as follows:  “It’s true, your honor, I’ve 
spent a lifetime lying and cheating and stealing, but I couldn’t 
help myself.  I was a Broadway Producer.”2    
It should be noted that at the first staged reading of 
Brooks’s show this line got the afternoon’s biggest laugh—from 
an audience made up almost entirely of Broadway producers.  
But in what I am still referring to as the old days, for every 
producer like a Max Bialystock or a David Merrick, there were 
half a dozen Kermit Bloomgartens, Leland Haywards, and 
Harold Princes—consummate professionals who had made 
  
 1 Zachary Pincus-Roth, Movies Aren't the Only B.O. Monsters, VARIETY, Jan. 
9, 2006. 
 2 THE PRODUCERS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968). 
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lives for themselves in the theater, perhaps first as stage 
managers, then as company managers, then finally as full-
fledged producers.  These were men and women as dedicated to 
the theater as the most dedicated playwright.  They survive 
today in the person of producers like Manny Azenberg and Liz 
McCann.   
But with the geysers of money tapped into by shows like 
Cats and Les Miserables, it was only a matter of time before a 
new breed of producer appeared on the scene.  And when that 
new breed arrived, predictably, it came from Hollywood.   
First came Disney, mounting enormously successful 
stage versions of its animated features like Beauty and the 
Beast and The Lion King.  Then came Fox Searchlight Pictures, 
Universal, and a number of other studios, often on their own, 
sometimes partnering with experienced Broadway presenters. 
When in Rome, most people make at least some attempt 
to do as the Romans do.  In this case, however, in at least one 
crucial area, the attempt was minimal. 
What the most aggressive of the movie studios brought 
with them was a desire to do business, not according to the 
theater model which put the playwright in first position, but 
according to the Hollywood model, in which the producing 
studio owned the author’s copyright and writers could be hired 
and fired at will.   
Individual writers, supported by organizations like the 
Dramatists Guild, have for the most part been able to resist the 
pressure to work under these conditions.   Usually, by simply 
refusing to do it.  But the pressures are intense, and with the 
appearance of more and more studio-produced musicals like 
Tarzan and Aida, those pressures are only going to grow more 
intense. 
Case in point:  Dreamworks Animation is gearing up to 
produce a stage version of its wildly successful animated 
feature film, Shrek.  The first Shrek grossed 455 million 
dollars.3  Its sequel grossed 880 million dollars.4  Add to this the 
vast revenues from toys, t-shirts, and who knows what else, 
and one would have to agree with the executives at 
Dreamworks Animation that the Shrek imprint represents a 
franchise of goldmine-like proportions. 
  
 3 See All-Time Worldwide Boxoffice Chart, http://einsiders.com/gross/top150-
world.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). 
 4 Id. 
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As such, the studio would argue, it has a duty to its 
shareholders to maintain control of anything and everything 
which appears under the Shrek banner.  And that control 
would extend to the content, to every line of dialogue uttered in 
a dramatic adaptation. 
Who could disagree?   
The appearance behind a drugstore counter of one 
package of green, ogre-sized Shrek condoms could do 
immeasurable damage to the Shrek franchise.  As could a 
stubborn lyricist who insisted on making a green, ogre-sized 
Shrek condom joke in the middle of the opening number of 
Shrek: The Musical. 
So what’s to be done?  The studio’s interest in 
maintaining control of the content of the stage version of Shrek 
seems irreconcilable with the theatrical mandate which gives 
the playwright ultimate control of the work which he creates. 
Apparently a stand-off, but maybe one that doesn’t 
matter that much.  You could make a case that a great big 
Broadway musical version of an animated film like Shrek is sui 
generis.  That like other great big Broadway musicals based on 
animated films it has so little to do with what we traditionally 
think of as theater—Chekhov, Beckett, Rodgers & 
Hammerstein—that it’s actually O.K. if it makes its own rules.  
That whatever those rules are, you can build a wall around 
them and keep them quarantined.   
You could make that case, but you’d regret it.  Because 
if the author’s copyright in a Shrek-sized musical migrates 
from the bookwriter, composer, and lyricist to the producer, it 
will only be a matter of time before the producer of a straight 
play demands the same arrangement.   
Why?  Because as a general rule, what one producer 
gets, all producers want.  And the lowest common denominator 
deal tends to become the deal.   
In addition, the producer will argue, with some justice, 
that in order to raise money from his investors he must 
demonstrate that he has a deal which will protect their money 
at least as well as the next producer’s deal.  And if the next 
producer owns the author’s copyright and he doesn’t, he may 
have a hard time capitalizing his show. 
So—what we are looking at is indeed a slippery slope, 
down which the playwright’s copyright runs the risk of sliding 
into oblivion.   
Imagine for a moment that this change has already 
taken place.  Now imagine that Arthur Miller is still alive and 
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that he has just completed a play called Death of a Salesman.  
A producer has optioned it, put it into production, and that 
producer is now standing at the back of the theater as the 
curtain comes down at the end of the first preview.  The 
audience looks shell-shocked.  Middle-aged men are weeping 
openly as they walk past him up the aisle.  Understandably 
nervous, the producer wonders if maybe the Willy Loman story 
might not run just a little bit longer if it didn’t have such a 
downbeat ending.  After all, Willy doesn’t have to drive his car 
into a bridge abutment.  Why can’t all the Lomans—Linda, 
Happy, Biff, maybe even the hooker from the hotel in Boston—
why can’t they all pile into the family jalopy and take off on a 
comical but heartwarming cross-country road trip in which 
they confront their demons, defeat them, and start a new life in 
Alaska with Uncle Ben?   
Miller doesn’t want to write it?  The producer fires him 
and finds somebody who will.   
And now, on to the directors.   
Beginning perhaps ten years ago, theater directors 
launched an aggressive campaign to establish a new, 
independent property right—a director’s copyright—in the 
work which they create.  Speaking through their union, 
directors have gone to great pains to emphasize that, unlike 
producers, they are not attempting to wrest copyright away 
from the playwright.   
Which is true.   
They then go on to emphasize that the creation of a 
director’s copyright will have no impact on playwrights or on 
the way in which theater is and has been made for decades.   
Which is not true. 
On the contrary, if a director’s copyright is ever 
established, it will drastically limit a playwright’s ability to 
control the work which he creates, it will inevitably undermine 
the spirit of trust and openness which is essential to the 
collaborative process that makes theater happen, and it will 
have a deeply disruptive, potentially paralyzing effect on 
theatrical production generally. 
Unlike playwrights, directors are employees.  When a 
producer acquires the live performance rights in a play, he 
begins to hire the people who will make those performances 
possible: A set designer, a lighting designer, a costume 
designer, actors of course, and most importantly, a director. 
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It is the director’s status as an employee which has 
allowed directors as a group to organize, and to be certified as a 
labor union.   
And it is the directors’ union, the SSD&C, which has led 
the fight to create an intellectual property right where none 
has previously existed.  Ted Pappas, former President of the 
SSD&C, writing in the February, 1999 issue of American 
Theater Magazine, attempted to take this non-existent right for 
granted.  
“Property rights,” wrote Mr. Pappas, “give a director or 
a choreographer ownership of the staging they create for a 
production of a play or a musical.”5  This is certainly true of 
choreographers, who are specifically identified in the Copyright 
Act of 1976.  But it is not true of directors.   
In fact, there is no recognized property right that gives a 
director ownership of any aspect of a theatrical production.  
Traditionally, directors have not attempted to copyright their 
work, and no court has ever recognized the validity of a 
director’s copyright claim. 
Ron Shechtman, attorney for the SSD&C, has referred 
to the law in this area as “murky.”  In order to support this 
characterization, he and his union rely heavily on two cases, 
and perhaps one other, recently decided.   
The first, Mantello v. Hall,6 is generally cited as having 
supported the notion that directors can copyright their stage 
directions.  In fact, it did nothing of the kind. 
The case arose out of a production of Terrence McNally’s 
play Love! Valor! Compassion! mounted at the Caldwell 
Theater in Boca Raton, Florida in 1996.7  In 1994, Joe 
Mantello—a brilliant director with whom I have had the 
immense pleasure of working—staged the original production 
of Love! Valor! Compassion! in New York, where it won the 
Tony Award for Best Play.8 
Two years later, Mantello’s attention was directed to the 
Caldwell production, which was reportedly a virtual replica of 
his New York production, and he sued, alleging among other 
things, infringement of a copyright which he had acquired 
when he filed a copy of McNally’s script with his stage 
  
 5 Ted Pappas, Protecting the Director, AM THEATER MAG., Feb. 1999, at 6. 
 6 Mantello v. Hall, No. 97cv8196 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 21, 1997). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
648 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
directions written in the margins with the U.S. Copyright 
Office.9 
Mantello v. Hall was settled before it went to trial.10  
Mantello’s copyright filing had been processed by the Copyright 
Office without any opinion offered as to whether the stage 
directions which he had filed were in fact copyrightable or not.  
The court reached no decision on the matter.   
In response to defendant theater’s motion for summary 
judgment, the court did find that Mantello had in fact received 
a copyright certificate from the Copyright Office.  But both the 
filing of the claim and the issuance of the certificate were 
purely mechanical.  Nevertheless, “Possession of this 
certificate,” said Judge Ryskamp, “creates the presumption 
that the work in question is copyrightable.”11  Defendant’s 
assertion that stage directions are not copyrightable as a 
matter of law might or might not have been resolved at trial, 
but to quote Judge Ryskamp again, “with the record in its 
present undeveloped state, the Court cannot grant summary 
judgment on this basis.”12   
And that’s as far as it went. 
Another, more recent case, Einhorn v. Mergatroyd 
Productions,13 raised a director’s copyright claim in a similar, 
but slightly different context.  Plaintiff Einhorn was hired by 
defendant Mergatroyd to direct playwright Nancy McLernan’s 
play, Tam Lin.14  Einhorn was fired before the play opened.15  
Subsequent to his firing, he filed a copy of McLernan’s script 
with some of his stage directions written in the margins with 
the Copyright Office, a filing which—to quote Judge Kaplan in 
his opinion delivered from the bench—eventually “matured into 
a certificate of registration.”16 
Whether or not that certificate had any legal force—
indeed, whether, as a matter of law, stage directions are 
copyrightable at all, was an issue the court never reached—
  
 9 Id. 
 10 See Jesse Green, Exit, Pursued by a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 2, 
at 1. 
 11 Order Granting in Part and Den. in Part Mot. to Dismiss and/or for Summ. 
J. at 14, Mantello v. Hall, No. 97cv8196 (S.D. Fla. July 22, 1997). 
 12 Id. 
 13 426 F.Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 14 Id. at 191. 
 15 Id. at 192. 
 16 Transcript of Record at 12, Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F.Supp. 2d 
189 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006) (No. 05 Civ. 8600). 
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because prior to Judge Kaplan delivering his opinion, plaintiff 
director Einhorn had agreed to withdraw the registration.   
And that’s as far as that went. 
Finally, the granddaddy of all these cases, Gutierrez v. 
DeSantis.17  It was the first one to stir the pot and the one 
which demonstrates most clearly the potentially devastating 
effect of a director’s copyright on the way playwrights do their 
work, and on the vitality of theatrical production generally.  
The case involved a production of Frank Loesser’s The Most 
Happy Fella, directed at the Goodspeed Opera House and 
subsequently on Broadway, by Gerry Gutierrez in 1991.18   
As would later be the case in Einhorn and Mantello, 
Gutierrez attempted to copyright his work by filing a copy of 
his stage directions, written in the margins of Frank Loesser’s 
script, with the U.S. Copyright Office. 
As has been noted, such a filing is simply that—a filing.  
It does not establish a copyright, and in fact, there has never 
been a judicial determination that stage directions, filed by a 
director, are copyrightable. 
But for the sake of argument, let’s say they are.  Let’s 
say Mr. Gutierrez could and did acquire copyright ownership of 
his staging of The Most Happy Fella.  What would be the 
consequence? 
The Most Happy Fella opened on Broadway in 1956.  In 
the thirty-five years between that opening and Mr. Gutierrez’s 
revival, there must have been thousands of productions of this 
brilliant musical play.   
If Mr. Gutierrez could acquire copyright ownership of 
his staging, then the directors of each and every one of these 
productions could have acquired copyright ownership of theirs 
as well.  Had this happened, over the course of the last four 
decades  The Most Happy Fella  would have gradually ceased to 
exist as an independent piece of dramatic literature, giving way 
instead to a multitude of “Most Happy Fellas,” each one a legal 
partnership between Frank Loesser and a director whose 
production he and his heirs had, in all likelihood, never even 
seen. 
Should such copyright partnerships ever come into 
existence, they would clearly operate as liens on a playwright’s 
play, restricting—often in unknown and unpredictable ways—
  
 17 Gutierrez v. DeSantis, No. 95-1949 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 22, 1995). 
 18 Green, supra note 10. 
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the playwright’s fundamental right to control what he has 
created.   
But beyond that, they would have a potentially 
devastating effect on the facility and vitality of theatrical 
production. 
For example.  If at some point in the future, a theater 
wished to produce  The Most Happy Fella, they would be faced 
with a choice.  They could examine—how?—each of the then 
existing copyrighted productions and select the one they 
wished to reproduce.  Or they could proceed with their own 
original production, running the risk that a particular piece of 
business, or a stage effect, or their overall approach would be 
attacked by a director as an infringement of his previously 
copyrighted version. 
Of course, The Most Happy Fella is merely illustrative.   
Even plays which are currently in the public domain, 
plays which have been freely available to producers and 
directors and most importantly to the public for hundreds of 
years—Hamlet, King Lear—would acquire de facto copyrights 
as more and more directors asserted ownership of their 
versions of these classics.  Producing them would become 
increasingly problematic. 
And risky.   
Theaters do not want to be sued.  Indeed, most of them 
cannot afford the expense of defending a lawsuit.  And if 
directors are able to copyright their work, the day will 
inevitably come—and soon—when a theater decides to cancel a 
production simply because they have been threatened by a 
director who perceives—rightly or wrongly, it doesn’t matter—
that the theater’s production will infringe on a version which 
belongs to him. 
Infringement, of course, requires copying.  And copying 
requires access.  But directors are not attorneys, they are 
artists.  And there are plenty of artists—and I am not 
exempting playwrights—who are prone to see their influence in 
other people’s entirely original work.  It is not difficult to 
initiate a lawsuit.  It is even less difficult to write a letter 
threatening one. 
Which brings us back to the SSD&C.   
The directors’ union lays great emphasis on the fact that 
it has acted with restraint, that it has only pursued cases in 
which a director’s work has been copied intentionally, and in 
which the copying was substantial and pervasive. 
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These limits are meant to be reassuring.  But obviously 
they are self-imposed.  And if a director’s copyright is ever 
established, it will belong, not to the union, but to directors 
individually.   
Consider Mr. Mantello and Mr. Gutierrez again.  Both 
have said that the directing work they’ve done has not always 
risen to a level where they personally felt it deserved copyright 
protection.  Yes it did, said Mr. Mantello of his award-winning 
production of Love! Valor! Compassion!  No it didn’t, of his 
award-winning production of Glenngary Glenn Ross.  Yes it did, 
said Mr. Gutierrez, of his award winning production of The 
Most Happy Fella.  No it didn’t, of his award-winning 
production of The Heiress. 
Could any judgment be more subjective?  What if Mr. 
Mantello disagreed with Mr. Gutierrez, and argued that Mr. 
Gutierrez’ staging of The Heiress did deserve copyright 
protection?  Who would be the better judge? 
In a letter to the New York Times, director Charles 
Marowitz offered the following: 
As a director who has found his staging appropriated by less 
resourceful colleagues, I know that without the text prompting 
motivation, movement and gestures, no director would be able even 
to begin ‘staging’ a play.  Directorial conception, however, is 
altogether different from staging and adds an entirely new 
dimension to a dramatist’s work.  Reinterpretations of both modern 
or classic plays should be entitled to copyright protection because 
they are the original outgrowth of a director’s imagination.19 
But who decides?  Who determines when a “director’s 
imagination” has been sufficiently activated to give birth to a 
copyrightable piece of work?  Who decides when it hasn’t?  Are 
objective standards even possible?  And isn’t any line in the 
sand which makes some direction copyrightable and some not 
an invitation to an avalanche of litigation casting a cloud over 
some theatrical productions and paralyzing others? 
Clearly, I would say yes.  I would also say that I share 
the universal feeling that something fundamentally unfair has 
happened when a “less resourceful” director, to use Mr. 
Marowitz’s phrase, puts up a production which clearly 
duplicates one mounted by someone else.  If an artist is proud 
of what he’s done, he wants credit for it.  He certainly does not 
  
 19 Charles Marowitz, Letter to the Editor, Stage Copyrights; What the 
Director Brings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006 (responding to Green, supra note 10). 
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want someone else taking credit for it.  And without question, 
what happens in a case like this feels instinctively like 
stealing. 
In the end, of course, it’s only stealing if the thing taken 
belonged to somebody.  And not everything which feels unfair, 
or is unfair, can or should be corrected by the courts.   
At first glance, it would appear that the SSD&C’s 
campaign to create a director’s copyright is an attempt to 
correct the fundamental unfairness described above.  But let’s 
take a second glance.   
Interviewed by the New York Times for an article about 
director’s copyright and the Einhorn case, SSD&C attorney 
Ron Shechtman had this to say: 
If it’s truly a collaborative art form, then why is it only the author 
who participates in the subsidiary rights that flow from a successful 
New York production?  The appropriate resolution is to give fair 
credit to all the artists’ contributions.  One day, it may end up that 
the author gets eighty percent, the director ten percent, the original 
cast X and the designers Z.  Because, at bottom, this is all about 
money.20 
“Because at bottom, this is all about money.” 
Well, maybe it is, and maybe it isn’t, but for the 
moment, let’s take Mr. Shechtman at his word.  If the union’s 
push to establish a director’s copyright is even mostly about 
money, and even more specifically money generated from a 
first New York production, then the director should be looking, 
not to the playwright, but to the New York producer for his 
payday. 
When a producer takes the risk involved in mounting a 
new play or musical on Broadway, he is giving the authors 
something of enormous value beyond the production itself.  He 
is giving them the visibility and status which attaches to 
having written a “Broadway show.”   
This visibility immediately increases the value of all the 
subsidiary rights which the authors retain.  These include the 
right to license stock and amateur productions of the show, the 
right to sell it to the movies, the right to authorize a future 
Broadway revival, and so on.   
In recognition of this value added, the authors grant the 
producer a participation, and a substantial one, in all revenues 
  
 20 Green, supra note 10. 
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they realize from the exploitation of these rights for a defined 
period of time.  
The revenues flow to the authors because, as authors, 
the sub rights belong to them.  But they share them with the 
producer in recognition of the production he mounted, and by 
extension, in recognition of the contributions made by all of the 
artists the producer hired to make that first production 
possible. 
Foremost among those artists is, of course, the director, 
who has negotiated an employment contract with the producer 
specifying the compensation he will receive in exchange for his 
labors.  If, as part of his compensation, the director, and the 
director’s union, feel he should be entitled to a participation in 
the author’s sub rights, then it is not to the author, but to the 
producer’s pre-negotiated share of those sub rights that he 
should logically look when he is negotiating his contract. 
Copyright, as wielded by the SSD&C, has begun to feel 
like a sledgehammer.  If directors think they can use it to 
surgically remove a small stream of income from the 
playwright’s subsidiary rights, then not only do they have their 
hands on the wrong weapon, but if they continue to swing it, 
aggressively and irresponsibly, the law of unintended 
consequences says the landscape of theatrical production in 
this country may be altered in ways which no one can entirely 
predict, but which we may all, directors included, come to 
regret. 
Copyright law, as I understand it, exists to maximize 
the creative output of artists, so that their work can enrich the 
marketplace of ideas necessary to inform and challenge the 
citizens of a vital, vibrant democracy.   
What is and isn’t entitled to copyright protection should 
be determined by this largest goal.   
David Mamet once said that people come to the theater 
to be told the truth.  From Sophocles to Shakespeare to O’Neill, 
the voice that has spoken that truth has been the voice of the 
playwright.  Anything we do, whether intentionally or 
inadvertently, which hobbles that voice or hampers access to it, 
we do as a society at our peril. 
